Some see Ukraine’s fight as a defining battle for freedom. Others dismiss it as a reckless provocation. This divide is not just academic. It has profound consequences – and not just for Ukraine. My recent column in Quadrant, “A Feckless President’s Betrayal,” argues that US President Donald Trump’s approach to the war in Europe has betrayed Ukraine, its Western allies and America itself. The column sparked intense debate. Online comments from some readers echoed pro-Putin arguments advanced by American economist Jeffrey Sachs – and the Kremlin’s own talking points.

Sachs’s views have been circulating widely on social media since his 19 February speech to the European Parliament. He argues NATO provoked Russia’s invasion and downplays Ukraine’s sovereignty. He contends that Ukraine should have negotiated with Moscow rather than turning West. Sachs has promoted these arguments across numerous platforms, including Russian state television, relentlessly shifting blame from the aggressor to those resisting it.

Sachs’s viewpoint raises a fundamental question. How should we approach foreign policy in the face of aggression?

Former US President Ronald Reagan offers helpful clarity. Reagan did not accommodate Soviet expansionism. He confronted it. His doctrine of “peace through strength” meant supporting nations resisting tyranny. When Reagan stood at the Brandenburg Gate and demanded, “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall,” he was not seeking accommodation with Moscow but liberation for those under its boot. History validated his strategy when the Soviet empire collapsed peacefully.

This historical lens offers a useful framework for considering the current debate over Ukraine. While readers have raised serious issues, the broader debate is shaped by competing narratives about the conflict’s origins and Western policy. These claims deserve careful scrutiny, beginning with perhaps the most pervasive: the myth about NATO expansion.

The NATO Expansion Myth

Central to Sachs’s worldview is the claim that NATO’s eastward expansion forced Russia’s hand. According to this narrative, the West broke solemn promises made in 1990 not to expand “one inch eastward” after German reunification. The West’s subsequent enlargement encircled Russia with hostile forces and left Putin no choice but to invade.

This narrative collapses under scrutiny.

First, Putin himself has contradicted this rationale. In a June 2022 speech marking Peter the Great’s 350th birthday, Putin explicitly compared his actions in Ukraine to the Tsar “reclaiming” Russian lands, suggesting territorial ambitions rather than defensive concerns. This was not about NATO – it was about empire.

Second, there is no historical basis for the claim that NATO broke a promise not to expand eastward. No formal treaty or written agreement containing such a sweeping commitment exists. Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet leader at the time, explicitly refuted this narrative. In an October 2014 interview with Russia Beyond, he stated plainly: “The topic of NATO expansion was not discussed at all.”

According to diplomatic historian Mary Sarotte, declassified records show that discussions concerned NATO forces in former East Germany specifically – not a permanent ban on sovereign nations joining the alliance. Sachs’s claim rests entirely on selective interpretations of informal discussions during German reunification. This is hardly the basis for a binding international commitment that would permanently deny sovereign nations their right to choose alliances.

The 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act further undermines this “broken promise” narrative. In this formal agreement, Russia acknowledged NATO’s plans for expansion while receiving assurances about military deployments. If a binding “no expansion” pledge had existed in 1990, this later document would have been unnecessary.

Third, NATO’s actual approach toward Ukraine disproves claims of aggressive expansion. Despite growing security concerns, NATO repeatedly delayed Ukraine’s membership prospects. Even after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, the alliance still declined to offer Ukraine a Membership Action Plan. When Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukraine remained years away from possible NATO membership. This directly contradicts Putin’s claim that NATO posed an imminent threat.

Fourth, NATO’s expansion does not pose an offensive threat to Russia. NATO is, by design and practice, a defensive alliance. In its 75-year history, it has never invaded a country or launched an unprovoked attack. The defensive weapons systems deployed in Eastern European NATO countries pose no offensive threat to Russia’s territory or sovereignty. Yet, Sachs and others often draw false equivalences, comparing NATO’s presence in Poland to a hypothetical scenario of Russian missiles in Mexico. This analogy is deeply flawed. NATO’s defence systems in Poland are designed to intercept, not to strike. They lack the range and payload for offensive operations against Russia.

Finally, Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO in 2023 further undermines the idea that NATO’s growth provoked Russia’s invasion. NATO’s Scandinavian expansion doubled the alliance’s border with Russia. Yet, Moscow’s response was notably restrained. As Atlantic Council analyst Peter Dickinson observed, if NATO expansion truly posed an existential threat, Russia should have reacted far more aggressively. The fact that Putin tolerated NATO’s expansion in Northern Europe – but responded with war to Ukraine’s Western alignment – further reinforces that this was never about NATO. It was about controlling Ukraine.

The NATO expansion myth thus stands revealed for what it is: a convenient fiction designed to obscure imperial ambition behind a facade of defensive necessity. Russia’s war in Ukraine is not about security – it is about subjugation.

Russia’s Broken Promises to Ukraine

Those who blame the West for provoking Russia often conveniently overlook Russia’s own broken commitments. In 1994, Ukraine possessed the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal – a Soviet inheritance that included approximately 1,900 strategic nuclear warheads. Ukraine voluntarily surrendered this entire arsenal under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, receiving security assurances from Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom in exchange. All signatories pledged to respect Ukraine’s borders and to “refrain from the threat or use of force” against Ukraine.

This agreement represented a remarkable act of good faith by Ukraine. It eliminated a massive nuclear arsenal that could have served as the ultimate security guarantee against future aggression. Ukraine fulfilled its obligations completely, transferring all nuclear weapons to Russia for dismantling by 1996.

Russia’s invasion in 2014 and again in 2022 represents a clear violation of these commitments. If Russia was willing to break explicit security guarantees, how can it credibly claim its invasion was a defensive response to NATO? Far from being threatened by Ukraine, Russia had received Ukraine’s most potent weapons and had promised in return to respect its borders – a promise it subsequently broke.

Ukraine’s Right to Choose

Some readers suggested Ukraine should accept neutrality and territorial concessions for peace. This position ignores Ukraine’s history and Russian demands.

In 1991, over 90% of Ukrainians voted for independence – including majorities in every region, including Crimea.

Sachs falsely portrays Ukraine’s 2014 Euromaidan uprising as a US-backed coup. The protests began after President Viktor Yanukovych rejected an Association Agreement with the European Union. When security forces cracked down on demonstrators, the movement grew into a broader demand for reform.

Following these events, Russia annexed Crimea and backed separatist movements in the east. Ukraine subsequently sought closer ties with NATO, with public support for NATO membership rising significantly.

Despite the war’s toll, even in the east, a majority of Ukrainians have consistently opposed territorial concessions. In 2022, over 80% of respondents nationwide rejected ceding land. While opposition has declined, a December 2024 poll still found 51% opposed concessions, including 50% in the east.

Sachs claims the US sought or welcomed war in Ukraine. The evidence says otherwise.

Before Russia’s invasion, the Biden administration pursued diplomacy, seeking “a stable and predictable” relationship with Moscow. In late 2021, as intelligence pointed to a looming attack, the US and its allies launched multiple diplomatic efforts. Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in January 2022, while France and Germany attempted de-escalation through the Normandy Format.

But Russia’s demands were extreme – it insisted NATO withdraw from Eastern Europe and permanently block Ukraine from ever joining the alliance. The US and NATO rejected these ultimatums but remained open to dialogue on broader security concerns. Moscow, however, refused to engage on realistic terms.

Even after Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, diplomatic efforts continued, but Russia’s actions undermined any prospect of negotiations. Western leaders initially hesitated to send heavy weapons – Germany, for instance, delayed tank deliveries for months. If the US had wanted war, it would have escalated military aid far sooner. Instead, Ukraine’s allies only ramped up support when it became clear Russia was pressing for total conquest, not compromise.

The Phantom Peace Deal

Sachs has repeatedly claimed that Ukraine was close to a peace agreement in March 2022 but rejected it under pressure from the United States and United Kingdom. This narrative has been widely disseminated by those seeking to blame the West for prolonging the war.

The reality is different. While negotiations did take place in Istanbul, Ukrainian officials have consistently denied that a viable treaty was ever on the table. Former Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba dismissed the Russian proposals as “unrealistic” and tantamount to capitulation. President Zelensky likewise rejected claims that Boris Johnson or other Western leaders pressured Ukraine to walk away from negotiations, calling such assertions “illogical.”

What is often omitted from this narrative is the timing. In early April 2022, just as talks were underway, evidence of Russian atrocities in Bucha and other towns emerged as Russian forces withdrew from northern Ukraine. These revelations fundamentally altered the diplomatic landscape, causing public support for negotiations to collapse as Ukrainians confronted the scale of Russian war crimes.

Rather than Western interference, it was Russia’s own conduct that derailed diplomacy. The Istanbul talks never produced terms acceptable to Ukraine, and Moscow’s actions on the battlefield contradicted any serious commitment to peace.

How Wars Actually End

History shows that wars end when aggressors perceive that the costs of continuing exceed the potential gains. This is not opinion but a pattern seen across conflicts. The Korean War ended in stalemate after China and North Korea recognised they could not drive UN forces from the peninsula. The Vietnam War concluded when the costs to America – both human and political – became unsustainable. Both the Soviet Union and the US eventually abandoned their objectives in Afghanistan when determined resistance made the costs unsustainable.

Appeasement rarely secures peace – history proves as much. When aggression is rewarded, it rarely satiates the aggressor. The Munich Agreement of 1938 ceded Czech territory to Hitler in exchange for promised peace. Within six months, Hitler took the rest of Czechoslovakia and, within a year, invaded Poland, triggering a world war.

Putin’s rhetoric suggests continued expansionism. He has written extensively about Ukraine not being a legitimate state. His demands have escalated over time – from opposing NATO membership to claiming Ukrainian territory. When concessions were made in Minsk I and Minsk II, these became platforms for further demands, not endpoints.

This is not to say negotiations are pointless. They are essential. But, effective negotiations require the aggressor to face meaningful costs. Territorial concessions without significant costs to Russia would signal that aggression delivers rewards – precisely the message that has historically led to more extensive conflicts.

The tragedy of war demands that responses be based on what has proven effective in ending conflicts, not on what might be wished to be true. Rushing to concede to an aggressor’s demands has rarely secured lasting peace when the aggressor believes further gains remain possible at acceptable costs.

The path to genuine peace lies in making continued aggression too costly, creating conditions where diplomacy offers Russia a better outcome than continued fighting. This approach does not extend the conflict – it creates the conditions under which conflicts actually end.

Beyond The Myths

The temptation to assign responsibility for global conflicts to major powers like America has a long intellectual history. This perspective has merit in some cases – the 2003 Iraq invasion being a notable example. However, when applied universally, whether from concern about Western interventionism or scepticism about official narratives, it can lead to interpretations where the primary aggressor is recast as responding to provocation.

Sachs is a respected economist. But his analysis of Ukraine is flawed. It ignores key historical and strategic realities. His appearances on Russian state television have raised concerns about whether his perspective, whatever its intentions, inadvertently lends credibility to narratives that downplay Russia’s responsibility.

At stake are fundamental questions about the rules-based international order – one that, despite its imperfections, has helped prevent major wars between states since 1945. This is not just a geopolitical chess match. It is a test of whether might makes right or whether even powerful nations must respect their neighbours’ borders and choices.

To read the full article on the Quadrant website, click here.