German state elections rarely warrant a column in New Zealand. But when an election threatens to end Germany’s post-war political order, an exception is justified.

This September, three East German states – Thuringia, Saxony and Brandenburg – will elect new Parliaments. The results promise a political earthquake. Its tremors are already being felt.

The three states represent just over 10% of Germany’s population, but their elections are much more significant than their size would suggest. Not only because there are similar political shifts underway in other states, but also because the outcome will influence federal dynamics ahead of the 2025 general election.

For more than a year, politicians and journalists have eyed 1 September like a rabbit eyes a snake. That is the date Thuringia and Saxony vote (Brandenburg follows three weeks later). They know this day could change everything in German politics.

It is the day that voter anger could bury Germany’s traditional party-political system, and its foreign policy settings with it.

On latest polls, the parties forming the federal government – Social Democrats (SPD), Greens and Liberals (FDP) – are set for a catastrophic result. Saxony: 12 percent combined. Thuringia: a mere 10 percent.

These numbers are so low, some – or all – of the three parties might not even reach the 5% threshold.

Normally, such a poor centre and centre-left result would mean a centre-right landslide. But not this time. In Saxony, the polls show the Christian Democrats (CDU) at only 29 percent. At 21 percent in Thuringia, it is even worse.

Where have all the voters gone? To three different but similar parties: the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), the ex-communist The Left, and the populist Alliance Sahra Wagenknecht (in German: Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht – BSW).

Combined, the AfD, The Left and BSW command 65 percent in Thuringia and 52 percent in Saxony – with the AfD the strongest party in both states.

These three parties could not be more different politically. Yet they share one crucial goal: the rejection of Germany’s post-war consensus on foreign policy.

These state elections have become a battleground for federal issues. The ongoing war in Ukraine, Germany’s stance towards Russia, and debates about NATO membership dominate the campaigns. Even Germany’s ties to the Western economic framework are under scrutiny.

Of course, geopolitical matters usually belong with the federal government in Berlin. Yet in Thuringia, Saxony and Brandenburg, the war in Ukraine has pushed aside traditional state-level topics like education and transport. On top of that, there is a broader frustration with the state of the country, which the extreme parties are skilfully exploiting.

At the heart of these election battles lies what the Germans call Westbindung. It is the policy of Western integration, which has been a crucial element of German foreign policy since the end of World War II. Konrad Adenauer, West Germany’s first post-war Chancellor, saw it as crucial to prevent a return to militarism and to protect against Soviet expansion at the time of the Cold War.

For decades, Westbindung enjoyed broad support across Germany’s political spectrum. As historian Heinrich August Winkler famously described it, it was the end point of Germany’s “Long Road West” (the title of Winkler’s acclaimed two-volume history of Germany).

Westbindung was more than just a single policy; it became part of the Federal Republic’s identity. It defined what the country wanted to be: a liberal democracy like France, the United Kingdom and especially the United States.

The AfD, The Left and BSW each question this long-standing consensus, albeit from different angles. They have three vital issues in common: Ukraine, Russia and NATO.

The AfD advocates stopping arms deliveries to Ukraine and seeks warmer relations with Russia. It openly questions Germany’s NATO membership, tapping into lingering East German resentments.

The Left, true to its East German roots, is especially close to Moscow. It also opposes arming Ukraine and views NATO as a relic of Cold War aggression.

The BSW, led by former The Left politician Sahra Wagenknecht, echoes these sentiments. Just like the Kremlin, it blames NATO expansion for provoking Russia. It also displays a certain nostalgia for bygone East German ties with Moscow.

These messages resonate in former East Germany. Many East Germans have never taken Winkler’s long road West, instead remaining emotionally closer to Russia. The established parties struggle to counter these narratives. Their commitment to Westbindung is now a political liability in the East.

Indeed, in Saxony, Brandenburg and Thuringia, ‘the West’ has almost become a dirty word. Both Brussels and Washington are increasingly painted as enemies rather than allies.

Whether they realise it or not, these voters are effectively playing into Putin’s hands. Some of them, at least, are doing so with open enthusiasm. At an AfD party convention over the weekend, a speaker earned enthusiastic applause by declaring “I support Putin” and blamed the West for war crimes, not Russia. Such are the warped perceptions on parts of the East German political spectrum.

The rise of these anti-Westbindung parties creates many problems. The first is forming viable state governments in such a fractured party-political system.

In the early post-war period, German politics was relatively straightforward. There were three main parties: the centre-left SPD, the centre-right CDU/CSU, and the liberal FDP. The FDP could partner with either of the two larger parties, creating stable coalitions.

This changed with the emergence of the Greens in the 1980s, and, after reunification, The Left. While these parties at first complicated matters, they eventually found ways to cooperate with the more established parties, at least at the state level.

But such arrangements are practically impossible with the AfD and the BSW. The AfD’s extreme positions and rhetoric make it untouchable for other parties. Meanwhile, the BSW’s populist stance and foreign policy views similarly rule out cooperation with traditional parties.

Sahra Wagenknecht has declared that her BSW would only form coalitions at state level with parties that stop weapons deliveries to Ukraine and oppose the US stationing new cruise missiles in Germany. Both are federal issues, of course. But by making them a condition for state coalitions, Wagenknecht shows where her priorities lie.

As a result, forming majority coalitions in Thuringia, Saxony and Brandenburg will be difficult. In fact, it may be impossible without including at least one of these anti-Westbindung parties.

What happens at state level has implications for federal politics – not least because Germany will go the polls next year. Even the remote possibility of one of these pro-Russian parties entering government will make Germany’s allies question its reliability.

Any weakening of Germany’s commitment to Western alliances would upset the balance of power within the EU and potentially destabilise NATO’s eastern flank.

These are ‘only’ three state elections in eastern Germany. But they contain the seeds of a political earthquake for Western politics and security.

And that would make Vladimir Putin the real winner of these elections.

To read the full article on the Newsroom website, click here.